

Philosophy of Logic and Language  
**Intensional Contexts**

**Primary Readings**

- (!) **Frege, G.** ‘**On Sense and Reference**’ in Frege G., *Translations from Philosophical Writings*, tr. by Black, M. & Geach, P. (Blackwell, 1952) (Reprinted in Moore).
- (!) **Davidson, D.**, ‘**On saying that**’, in Davidson, D., *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, OUP, (2001).
- (!) **Kripke, S.**, ‘**A puzzle about belief**’, in Margalit, A. (ed.), *Meaning and Use* (Also reprinted in Salmon, N. & Soames, S. (eds), *Propositions and Attitudes*, OUP (1988) and in Martinich).
- (!) **Saul, J.**, ‘**Substitution and simple sentences**’, *Analysis* 57 (1997), pp. 102-108.
- **Quine, W.V.**, ‘**Quantifiers and the Propositional Attitudes**’, *Journal of Philosophy* 53 (1956), pp. 177-187. (Reprinted in Martinich).
- **Rumfitt, I.**, ‘**Content and Context: the Paratactic Theory Revisited and Revised**’, *Mind* 102 (1993), pp. 429-454.
- **Salmon, N.**, *Frege’s Puzzle*, MIT press (1986).
- **Crimmins & Perry**, ‘**The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs**’, *Journal of Philosophy* 86 (1989), pp. 685-711. (Reprinted in Ludlow (ed.), *Readings in the philosophy of Language*, MIT Press (1997)).

**Background Readings:**

- Richard, M., ‘Propositional Attitudes’, in Hale & Wright.
- Platts, M., *Ways of Meaning*, MIT press (1997), ch. 5

**Questions:**

- (1) How, if at all, do the truth conditions of the sentence ‘Louis Lane believes that Superman is strong’ differ from those of the sentence ‘Louis Lane believes that Clark Kent is strong’?
- (2) How, if at all, does the semantic role of the name ‘Hesperus’ differ in ‘Hesperus shines in the morning’ from its semantic role in ‘Jane believes that Hesperus shines in the morning’?
- (3) Is there a difference in meaning between ‘John said that someone is a spy’ and ‘There is someone such that John said that he is a spy’? If so, how can we account for this difference?